Search

We audited the city of Dallas’ management of its community housing development organizations (CHDO).  We performed this audit because of our previous audit work on the City’s Home Investment Partnerships program.  During that audit, we concluded that the City did not follow HOME regulations and its own policies and procedures in its reconstruction program or the administration of its match contributions,

We initiated our audit in accordance with our strategic goal to provide the U.S.

We audited the U.S.

In violation of the housing assistance payment contract’s conflict-of-interest requirements, the former executive director of the Housing Authority of the City of Beeville, TX, executed housing assistance payment contracts on behalf of the Authority with her brother and sister.  The former executive director did not fully disclose the conflicts-of-interest and had not sought a waiver from HUD’s Office of Public and Indian Housing unt

The U.S.

HUD has a contract with Leidos Innovations Corporation for E-Discovery services using the E-Discovery Management System.  The process for collecting electronically stored information (ESI) and delivering it to customers has two major subprocesses: (1) an initial ESI collection and (2) a keyword search to refine the initial collection results.  OGC’s and Leidos’ collection of ESI does not meet customer demand because processing ESI re

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) oversight of the disposition of real properties assisted with Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds.  We conducted the audit as part of our annual audit plan.  Our audit objective was to determine whether HUD had adequate controls over the disposition of real properties assisted with CDBG funds.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) oversight of disaster grantee procurement processes.  We conducted the audit after prior audits identified procurement issues.  Our objective was to determine whether HUD provided sufficient guidance and oversight to ensure that disaster grantees followed proficient procurement processes when purchasing products and services.

Very low REAC scores are not prevalent across ORCF’s portfolio.  The majority of RCFs that received a REAC score scored at least 80 on their last inspection, and more than three quarters scored at least 60.  Despite the small percentage of RCFs that scored below 31, we noticed an overall decline in REAC inspection scores across ORCF’s portfolio from 2000 to 2016.

We received a referral from the Quality Assurance Division of the U.S.