Implement a policy to ensure that monitoring of RAD PBV projects includes, at a minimum, a review of the accuracy of the reserve for replacement account balances and compliance with HUD’s physical condition and inspection requirements.

Review the reserve for replacement accounts for the 12 underfunded projects to ensure that the account balances are maintained in accordance with the applicable HUD requirements and executed HUD business documents and require owners to fully fund any underfunded reserves, as applicable.

Review the reserve for replacement accounts for the 14 project owners that did not make annual adjustments for inflation, as identified in the capital needs assessment, to determine whether the account balances are sufficient to meet anticipated capital needs. If the account balances are not sufficient, HUD should require the owners to appropriately fund the accounts.

Implement a plan to review the reserve for replacement accounts for all RAD PBV projects to ensure that reserve for replacement accounts are appropriately funded.

Obtain documentation from the PHAs to support that more than $1 million in withdrawals from the eight reserve accounts complied with HUD’s requirements or require the project owners to reimburse the reserve accounts for the unsupported withdrawals.

Collect data on projects’ reserve for replacement accounts to support the Office of Field Operations’ monitoring activities.

Develop a strategy to comprehensively assess and respond to fraud risks across NYCHA. The strategy should identify who within NYCHA is responsible for designing and overseeing activities to prevent and detect fraud. The strategy should also include how NYCHA will (1) assess fraud risks across NYCHA methodically and periodically, (2) create response plans for fraud risks that are identified, and (3) monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of fraud risk management activities. The strategy should also designate fraud risk responsibilities across NYCHA.

Based on the strategy, (1) complete an assessment of fraud risks across NYCHA, (2) create response plans for fraud risks that are identified, and (3) develop procedures to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of fraud risk management activities.

Assess whether HUD’s other extra-large PHAs have mature fraud risk management programs and use the assessment to develop a strategy to reduce the fraud risk exposure to HUD. The strategy should include working with extra-large PHAs to implement appropriate fraud mitigation activities.

Work with HUD’s Chief Risk Officer to issue a notice to all PHAs explaining that PHAs are responsible for fraud risk management and play a role in fulfilling HUD’s requirement to identify and mitigate fraud risks. This notice should clearly indicate that PHAs should implement fraud risk management, which includes (1) completing an assessment of fraud risks, (2) creating response plans for fraud risks that are identified, and (3) developing procedures to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of fraud risk management activities.

Obtain lead-based paint risk assessments for the five developments for which hazard reduction work was completed and perform the required reevaluations.

Determine whether the remaining five developments (Imperial Courts, Mar Vista Gardens, Nickerson Gardens, Ramona Gardens, and Rancho San Pedro) have deteriorated paint and if so, obtain lead-based paint risk assessments and reevaluations when applicable.

Implement adequate policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that public housing properties will be inspected within required timeframes.

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Housing and Voucher Programs enhance SEMAP or develop a new performance measurement process that would identify PHAs with underperforming HCV Programs, which should include an assessment of PHAs’ ability to maximize assistance to house families.

We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Field Operations provide training and guidance to field office program staff on SEMAP scoring, rating, and verification procedures, including confirmatory reviews, quality control reviews, and adjustments, as appropriate, for the revised SEMAP process.

In conjunction with corrective actions being taken on previous audits, revise ONAP’s internal policy and procedures to include detailed written policies and procedures for the marketing, preservation, and sale of defaulted loan notes and REO properties on tribal trust and other restricted lands.

Require the REAC in coordination with OFO to determine the number of developments and associated units that contain lead-based paint and lead-based paint hazards.

We recommend that the General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing require the Real Estate Assessment Center in coordination with the Office of Field Operations to determine the cost to eliminate or control the lead-based paint and lead based paint hazards in public housing and the timeframe to complete such work based on the existing funding levels and strategies that could accelerate the timeframe.

We recommend that the General Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing require the Real Estate Assessment Center in coordination with the Office of Field Operations to assess the lead-based paint hazard reduction activities performed at the 19 developments associated with 18 public housing agencies reviewed that did not implement interim controls and ongoing maintenance and reevaluation activities or adequately document that previously identified lead-based paint had been abated or treated with interim controls and subjected to ongoing maintenance and reevaluation activities. If those reduction activities did not fully abate the lead-based paint, HUD should ensure that the public housing agencies implement interim controls and ongoing maintenance and reevaluation programs and maintain required documentation.

Use the fraud risk inventory to enhance program-specific fraud risk assessments for the TBRA and Operating Fund programs.